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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
AND NATURE OF CASE
This appeal is taken by the Defendants from the lower court's
Memorandum Decision and Declaratory Judgment granting summary
judgment for the Plaintiff. The judgment of the lower court, dated May 11,
1988, was a final Order and a Judgment from which an appeal could proceed.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has jurisdiction to hear this appeal
under Utah Code Section 78-2-2(3)(e)(iii) and 78-2-2(3)(j).
The Defendants (collectively referred to herein as the "State"
unless otherwise indicated) through the Director of State Lands, issued an
audit of State Coal Lease ML-18148 (hereinafter referred to as the "State
Lease") to the Plaintiff (herein referred to as "Blackhawk") and demanded
payment of alleged unpaid royalties. Blackhawk challenged the audit in an
action for declaratory judgment against the State. Blackhawk prevailed and
the trial court granted its Motion for Summary Judgment and entered a
judgment reversing the decision of the Director which had upheld the
Division of State Lands' audit.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Blackhawk is not satisfied with the State's Statement of Issues
contained in Brief of Appellants and, in pursuance of Rule 24(b) of the Rules
of the Utah Supreme Court, includes herein its own Statement of Issues, to
wit:

(1) Did the District Court properly find the royalty provision in
the State Lease ambiguous?
(2) Did the District Court properly construe the royalty
provision in light of the parties' actions and performance?
(3) Did the District Court properly find that the royalty
provision was not self executing?
(4) Did the District Court properly find that the State may not
retroactively apply its new policy imposing a royalty rate of eight percent?
(5) Did the District Court properly find that the prevailing
Federal royalty rate during the Audit Period was not eight percent.
(6) Did the District Court properly rule that the State is
prohibited from demanding payment of royalties on coal mined during the
audit period at a rate higher than that paid by Blackhawk and accepted by
the State, by reason of estoppel, laches, waiver, and the Statute of
Limitations?
(7) Did the District Court properly rule that the States ruling
relative to imposing interest and penalties for any royalty payment
deficiencies cannot be legally enforced?
(8) Did the District Court properly find that the States new
royalty policy is a rule which was invalid in that the State failed to comply
with the provisions of the Utah Administrative Rule Making Act?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This controversy stems from attempts by The Utah Division of
State Lands and Forestry ("the Division") to retroactively readjust the royalty
rate on the State Lease and from the Division's claim for an alleged
underpayment of royalties and interest thereon.
The subject lease was entered into on February 16, 1960,
between the State Land Board, as Lessor, and Carbon Development Company,
as Lessee. (Addendum 1) Blackhawk succeeded to the intrests of said
Lessee and Blackhawk's affiliate, Price River Coal Company, operated a mine
on the leased premises until 1983, when production under the subject lease
ceased.
The terms of the State Lease provide for the payment to the
State of a royalty in the amount of $0.15 per ton "or at the rate prevailing, at
the beginning of the quarter for which payment is being made, for Federal
Lessees of land of similar character under coal leases issued by the United
States at that time, whichever is higher. The lease form provides that the
State may readjust lease terms and conditions at the end of each twentyyear period. It is to be noted that the State Lease was originally approved
by the Board of State Lands and Forestry ("The Board") at a royalty rate of
$0.15 per ton of 2,000 lbs, of coal produced from the leased premises and
sold or otherwise disposed of. Under the readjustment provision, the lease
was subject to readjustment on December 31. 1979. No readjustment was
made by the State on or before that date; Blackhawk continued to pay the

specified production royalty at $0.15 per ton to the Division and the
Division accepted such payments without protest or objection after the
readjustment date—in fact, up to the date mining operations ceased in
1983.
More than one year after the date of readjustment had passed, (on January
14, 1981) the Division notified Franklin Real Estate Company (Blackhawk's
predecessor) that the Division intended to amend the lease to conform with
the State Coal Lease form then in use. (Addendum 2) The proposed
amendment would have dramatically increased the production royalty
from the specified $0.15 per ton to eight percent of the gross value of the
coal removed, with an escalator clause whereby the royalty rate would
increase to twelve and one-half percent of the gross value. Blackhawk
protested this tardy attempt at readjustment on the basis of the holding in
Rosebud Coal Sales Company v. Andrus, No. C79-160B (D. Wyo. June 10,
1980) which was appealed to and affirmed by the Tenth Circuit Court in
Rosebud Coal Sales Company v. Andrus, 667 F.2d 949 (1982). Blackhawk
also argued that the State had failed to provide any reasonable economic
analysis or basis for this excessive increase in royalty rate. Upon
consideration of these arguments at a July 8, 1981 hearing, the Board
directed the Division to draft a new lease, the terms of which would
contemplate a royalty rate of four percent of the coal removed for the first
five years and eight percent thereafter. As a condition precedent to any
lease adjustments, it was also decided to request an opinion from the Attorney General considering the legality of the State's readjustment of lease
terms at a time more than a year after the specified date of readjustment.
The Attorney General did not issue an opinion. Eventually, the Division
withdrew its demand that Blackhawk accept readjustment of the lease
4

terms, including the amended royalty rate under the terms of its proposed
lease form.
In its letter of January 4, 1982, signed by John T. Blake,
Minerals Resource Specialist, the Division Stated, in relevant part, that:
The Attorney General's Office... is not prepared to issue a formal
opinion on this subject at this time. Consequently, we are not
demanding that Blackhawk CoaJ Company accept readjustment
of the lease at this time.
My letter of December 11, 1981, was mereiy an invitation
for Biackhawk CoaJ Company to amend this Jease with our current
standardiease form, concurrent with the new year, at the readjusted
royalty authorized by the Land Board... ShouidBiackhawk CoaJ
Company choose to reject my invitation for iease amendment, they
may continue to operate under the original iease agreement untii
otherwise advised. (Emphasis applied) (Addendum 3) (R.297)
Biackhawk s counsel of record responded for the Company in a
letter of January 4, 1982, stating in part that:
Biackhawk will continue to pay to the State, on a
quarterly basis, the royalty of 15* per ton in compliance with
Article II 1(a) of the original Lease Agreement, since the
provisions of Article 111(b) of this Agreement are inapplicable
at the present time. (R. 299)
Nothing further was heard from the Division or the Board in this
respect until nearly four years later when the October 15, 1985 Audit Report
was issued.
At all times that mining operations were conducted under said
State Lease, including the period the State attempted a lease readjustment or
amendment and during the period covered by the audit (January 1979 to

December 1984, "the audit period") the Division accepted, without objection
or dispute, Blackhawk's royalty payments at the rate of $0.15 per ton. The
royalty so paid was clearly identified with each quarterly royalty payment
on the statement submitted by Biackhawk to the Division. That rate was
affirmed in Blackhawk's counsel's letter of January 7, 1982.
The Division proceeded with its audit of the lease during 1985
and issued an Audit Report, together with a letter from the Director of the
Division dated October 15, 1985, in which he discussed the filing of the audit.
(R. 303)
Biackhawk protested the audit's findings. The division
concluded that no adjustments to the audit would be made and issued its
demand letter of March 27, 1986. (R. 303) This demand letter was
recinded and a new letter issued May 16, 1986, demanding $1,940,43599
for alleged underpayment or royalty and $1,210,306.94 for accrued interest,
for a total of $3,150,742.93. (R. 314)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In the following summary, each argument is offered
independently of the others; each argument has its own basis in fact and law
which is supportive of the District Court's Memorandum Decision and
Judgment (Addendum 4 and 5):
A. The royalty provision of Article III Second (b) of the State
Lease is vague and ambiguous on its face and is therefor unenforceable.

B. Due to its vagueness and uncertainty, said lease provision
should be construed narrowly against the State and, by its terms and the
conduct of the parties, held to be a royalty of $0.15 per ton.
C. The phrase "at the rate prevailing" as contained in the lease
royalty provision, is not self executing; Blackhawk was under no duty to pay
royalties under the prevailing Federal rate until the parties had determined
what, in fact, was the prevailing rate.
D. The State is estopped from retroactively applying the
prevailing Federal rate clause and demanding royalties in excess of its $0.15
per ton rate for the reason that the State was fully cognizant of Blackhawk s
royalty payments and had accepted such payments at the $0.15 per ton rate
at all times during the audit period. Blackhawk will suffer serious financial
injury if the State, at this late date, is allowed to retroactively invoke a
Federal royalty rate.
E. The State, in basing its demand upon the Federal prevailing
rate clause, acknowledges its awareness of that clause, but failed to invoke it
in a proper and timely manner, consequently, the State is barred by laches,
waiver and the Statute of Limitations from demanding royalty payments at a
rate in excess of the agreed $0.15 per ton.
F. The States rule, attempting to impose an interest penalty —a
rule promulgated long after the issuance of the State lease and contrary to
the lease itself— is invalid and cannot be legally enforced.
G. The States royalty policy rule is invalid because of the
States failure to comply with the Utah Administrative Rule Making Act and
cannot be applied retroactively.

ARGUMENT!
I. The Standard of Review Urged bv the State is Inapplicable.
On page 8 of Appellants Brief, the State initiates a discussion of
Standard of Review, the essence of which is that the "issues before the court
have been decided against Plaintiff by the Director of State Lands. The
Court, when reviewing the decision of the Director, should not overrule the
Director's interpretation of the Division's rules, policies and regulations,
unless his decision is arbitrary or erroneous". (State's Brief, P. 9.)
This argument was rejected by the lower court. It is predicated
on an erroneous factual and legal premise.
The Audit Report, which was transacted under cover of
Division's letter of October 15, 1985, stated in part that:
The purpose of the examination of Blackhawk Coal Company was to
establish the validity of royalty reports submitted from January 1,
1979 through December 31, 1984, and to determine if lease terms had
been adhered to. (R. 305)
Blackhawk disagreed with the Audit Report and
requested reconsideration of the report by the Division. By letter of

i The State's Brief is replete with assertions which are not substantiated by
Record references as required by Rule 24(a)(7) of the Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court. The Brief of Plateau Mining Company, et al with which this
case is consolidated, contains an Appendix which itemizes such unsupported
assertions. Appellee will not burden this brief with such a list, but will point
to this Court's holding in FackreJJv. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah
1987) to the effect that should Appellant fail to provide adequate references
to the Record, the judgment of the lower court is presumed to be correct.

March 27, 1986, Blackhawk was notified that no adjustments would be
made to the audit and demanded payment. The Director of the Division
notified Blackhawk by letter of May 16, 1986, that the Divisions previous
demand letter was recinded. (R. 314) The action was necessitated by the
effect of Adkins v. The Division of State Lands and Forestry, 719 P.2d 524
(Utah 1986). The Division issued a new demand letter as of May 16, 1986,
for the amount claimed under the Audit Report.
Blackhawk did submit a brief to the Division entitled
"Statements of Reasons For Blackhawk Coal Company's Objection to
Retroactive Royalty Increases" and counsel for Blackhawk met informally
with the Director and several of his associates to discuss the matter, but
there was no record for the Court to review, other than Blackhawk's request
for reconsideration and the agency's two letters. There were no affidavits or
exhibits. No testimony was taken.
The State would obscure the point by urging that "This Court
should only inquire as to whether the Director acted in excess of his powers
in upholding the audit" citing Mcknight v. State Land Board, 381 P.2d at 731
(Utah 1963) and Atlantic Richfield Company v. Hinkel 432 F.2d 587 at 591
(10th Cir. 1970) (State's brief P. 9)
In Denver and R G. W. R R Co. v. Central Weber Sewer
Improvement District, et al 2%1 P.2d 884 (1955) this Court held that if the
record made revealed that the Sewer Commission had concluded a hearing,
taken evidence, heard witnesses under oath, and had proceeded in
accordance with due process requirements, and had the facts either
supported or negatived the Commission's findings and conclusions, the

reviewing court could have examined only the record before it to determine
if the Commission regularly had pursued its authority, or had abused its
discretion. In contradistinction, this Court then said "but when, as here,
there is nothing to review but an ipse dixit, a due process would be denied if
the reviewing court could not get at the facts. To hold otherwise, invites rule
by men, not laws..." (At page 887)

This court has already answered one

of the State's contentions in Adkins, supra, saying: "We generally give
deference to an administrative agency's construction of a statute where its
technical expertise is helpful or where the statute indicates the legislative
intention to commit broad discretion to an agency to effectuate the purposes
of the legislative scheme. However, on questions of statutory construction,
involving pure questions of law, we owe no deference to the administrative
determination." (At page 527) Citing Salt Lake CityCorporation v.
Department of Employment Security of Utah 657 P.2d 1312(1982).
The State's position is rooted in the proposition that the Director
has correctly decided the issues of contract construction, statutory
interpretation and the application of equitable principles. Syllogistically, the
State then declares there is no room for further review—simply, the issues
before the Court have been decided against Blackhawk by the Director of
State Lands. This, indeed, is to invite rule by men, not laws.
II. The District Court properly found:
A. The royalty provisions of Article III, Second (b) are vague
and ambiguous.
The royalty provisions of the State Lease provide, in pertinant
part, as follows:

The Lessee, in consideration of the granting of the rights
and privileges aforesaid, hereby covenants and agrees as follows:

SECOND: To pay to Lessor quarterly, on or before the
15th day of the month succeeding each quarter, royalty
(a) At the rate of 15<t per ton of 2000 lbs. of coal
produced from the leased premises and otherwise disposed of, or
(b) At the rate pevailing, at the beginning of the
quarter for which payment is being made, for federal lessees of land
of similar character on coal leases issued by the United States at that
time,
whichever is higher... (R. 244)
To succesfully withstand challenge, this lease provision must
adhere to the following standards:

The lands covered by the referenced leases must be within a
well-defined area or distance. It must be possible to make an exact
determination, on a case-by-case basis, of which reference leases
qualify to trigger the change in royalty. The reference leases should
cover the same quality or rank of coal, the same mining method, and
possibly, the same approximate depth. Errebo, "Coal Royalties". 26
Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 86 (1980)
The royalty provision in the State Lease fails to meet any of
these standards: Firstly, there is no well defined area. Ralph Miles, former
Director of the Division, interpreted it to be land in the same general area.
(Ralph Miles deposition of October 15, 1987, p. 10) (R. 319) John T. Blake,
Mineral Resource Specialist for the Division, was much more restrictive i.e.

he claimed it meant lands within the same mining operation. (John T. Blake
deposition of June 10, 1987, pages 12, 13, 28 and 29 ) (R. 321)
The phrase "land of similar character" as contained in this
royalty section was scrutinized by the Office of the Legislative General
Counsel and that office concluded:
.. .the term of "land of similar character" is so vague as to defy
a reasonable definition. Initially the problem becomes one of kind, i.e.
similar in what regard—size, productivity, value. Assuming,
arguendo, that similarity can be established, the second problem
arises when it is attempted to establish the magnitude of the lands
available for comparison, i. e. does the land have to be similar to land
in the same country, state, or region or is the entire United States
available for comparative similarities.
Without further explanation in the lease itself or without
knowing the intent of the parties, any definition given herein would
be totally inconclusive. (R. 317)
In his deposition, Douglas E. Johnson, Royalty Audit Supervisor
and Trust Accountant for the Division, opined that the phrase had no
significance in establishing the prevailing royalty rate:
Q. So it is not what is being paid for Federal lessees for land of
similar character. It is what you say the regulation says.
A. Similar character doesn't enter into it, other than you have
to look at... to see if it is a surface or a subsurface mine.
Q. I think you said, also, that land of similar character really
doesn't mean anything under this circumstance.
A. No it doesn't. The only difference that it made was whether
or not not it was a subsurface or surface mine. (P. 9 and 10,
Deposition of October 15, 1987) (R. 330)

The words of the Lease held no meaning for Mr. Johnson.
The ending phrase in the royalty provision "at that time" has
met with varying interpretations at the hands of Division personnel. John T.
Blake was of the opinion that it meant "at the time that Blackhawk was
mining coal from the State lease and paying royalty on the State lease."
(P. 14, Deposition of June 10, 1987) (R. 333) Ralph Aiello suggests that the
phrase refers to the same time frame as "at the beginning of the quarter".
(P. 8, 9, Deposition of September 2, 1987) (R. 334) In his deposition,
Douglas Johnson thought it meant at the time each royalty payment was
made (P. 10, Deposition of October 15, 1987) (R. 335)
The personnel within the Division administering the lease are
not in concert in their understanding of the lease language. Each person
seems to have his own version. It is not necessary to scrutinize the phrases
out of context to reveal fatal ambiguities. Viewed as a whole the provision is
just as ambiguous. The escalation portion of the royalty clause at Article III,
Second(b) is so vague, uncertain and ambiguous as to be unenforceable: the
only rate that is certain and understandable is the 15* per ton.
B. The royalty provision of Article HI, Second(b) must be
construed narrowly against the State and the course of action of the parties
dictates that the rate should be held at SO. 15 per ton.
In the construction of ambiguous contracts, the courts generally
hold that it is to be construed strictly against the contract drafter (in this
case, the State) and favorably to the other contracting party or parties.
Wells Fargo Bank NA v. Midwest Realty and Finance Inc, 544 P.2d 882 (Utah
1975); Sears v. Ricmersma, 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982)

More than twenty-eight years have elapsed since the State
lease was issued. The form used was one employed by the State for many
years before. For more than a decade and a half after its issuance, no heed
was given to this royalty provision because both State and Federal
governments had historically based coal royalties on cents per ton of coal
produced. In the past, both governments paid less attention to the royalty
issue than to the benefits derived from the development of the resource—
the jobs generated, the impetus to new industry and the new tax base that
such development provided. This was the genius behind the Federal mining
laws (30 U.S.C. S 21, et seq.) and the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, as
amended (41 Stat. 437, et seq.). The intent of the parties twenty-eight years
ago is a controlling factor and what that original intent was is a far cry from
what the State is urging today—a strained, contradictory construction, at
variance with law and based simply on the lessor's audit and demand made
after an unsuccessful attempt to readjust the lease and a quarter of a
century after the lessor and lessee had signed the document.
In the construction of an amiguous contract provision, to determine the
intent of the parties, the entire contract is to be reviewed, with the
ambiguous provision read in relation to other pertinent provisions. Sears,
Ibid. The course of performance of the parties is to be considered as
evidencing the parties' true intentions. Zeese v. Estate of Siegel 534 P.2d 85
(Utah, 1975; Monroe, Inc. v. JackB. Parson Construction Co, 604 P.2d 901
(Utah, 1979) This is the doctrine of practical construction and, if the parties
by their performance and actions, have demonstrated an interpretation of
the contract, then the court can enforce it accordingly.

Here, the parties conclusively demonstrated by actions and
performance, the understanding that the proper and accepted royalty rate
during the audit period was $0.15 per ton of coal.
In MonroQ supra, the parties entered into a written purchase
agreement for highway paving materials. Subsequently, they orally agreed
to amend the purchase order in several respects. Plaintiff confirmed these
contract changes in a letter addressed to the Defendant; the Defendant did
not respond to the letter, but accepted delivery of the materials from the
Plaintiff. The Court applied the UCC Title 70A §2-201(1), (2) and the
doctrine of practical consideration holding that even though Defendant did
not respond to and was silent as to the confirmatory letter, the Defendants
actions evidenced intent of the parties to consummate the agreement as
modified..
This case bears a striking similarity with Monroe. On
January 7, 1982, Blackhawk's counsel had delivered his letter to the Division
reiterating the royalty to be paid by Biackhawk. The letter served a
clarifying purpose in that the Division had finally abandoned its year-long
attempt to readjust the royalty rate, had offered Biackhawk a new lease with
a beginning royalty rate of four percent, escalating to eight percent (which
Biackhawk had rejected) and had voiced the expectation that future royalties
would be "at the same rate prevailing for similar Federal coal leases in the
area". (R. 299) The January 7, 1982 letter clearly stated Blackhawk's
position and re-emphasized that "Biackhawk will continue to pay to the
State, on a quarterly basis, the royalty of 15$ per ton in compliance with
Article 111(a) of the original lease agreement,, since the provisions of Article

IIKb) of this agreement are inapplicable at the present time". Ibid. It
should be remembered that this letter was written in response to Mr. John T.
Blake's letter of January 4, 1982, in which he wrote that "should Blackhawk
Coal Company choose to reject my invitation for lease amendment, they may
continue to operate under the original lease until otherwise advised". (R.
297) There was no response from the Division to Blackhawk's letter of
January 7, 1982 . There was total silence from the State until the audit and
demand letter of October 15, 1985, more than three and one-half years
later.

And the Division had continued to accept royalty payments at the

rate of 15<t per ton for so long as Blackhawk had continued to produce coal
from the leased premises.
These are the precise circumstances which dictated the lower
court's decision in which it said:
The factual situation in this case is more supportive of plaintiff's
motion than were the facts in the Plateau Mining case in that there
was an attempt by the defendants to renegotiate the lease in question
to a percentage of gross value of coal produced in 1981. That attempt
was never pursued by defendants and even withdrawn in January of
1982. Plaintiff, at that time, was informed by John T. Blake, Mineral
Resources Specialist of the State of Utah, Natural Resources and Energy
Department, Division of State Lands and Forestry, as follows: Should
Blackhawk Coal Company choose to reject my invitation for lease
adjustment, they may continue to operate under the original Lease
Agreement until otherwise advised.
The plaintiff responded in the letter to Mr. Blake on January 7,
1982, as follows: Blackhawk will continue to pay to the State, on a
quarterly basis, the royalty of $0.15 per ton in compliance with Article
111(a) of the original Lease Agreement, since the provisions of Article
111(b) of this Agreement are inapplicable at the present time.

Thereafter, plaintiff paid and defendant accepted without
comment or objection the $0.15 a ton in accordance with Article III
Second(a) of the lease. (Addendum 4)
C. "A t the rate prevailing", as that phrase is used in Article HI
Second!b), the State Lease, is not self-executing; until the royalty rate is
determined by the parties, Blackhawk is underno obligation to pay a royalty
different than that specified i.e. SO. 15 per ton.
Considering the vague, ambiguous nature of the royalty
provision, the assertion by the State that it is self-executing borders on the
improbable. The State would have the lessee responsible for adjusting the
royalty rate. The Attorney General's memorandum on the Division audit of
State land leases, dated March 7,1986 (R. 345) suggests that the royalty
clause is self-executing and analogous to the "adjustable rate mortgage". The
analogy is patently inappropriate. The mortgage company gives notice of
the interest change; it is not the borrower's provence to scamper around
attempting to determine on his own what might or might not be the
applicable interest rate.
Admittedly, it is Blackhawk's responsibility to notify the State
on each quarterly payment, the rate on which the royalty is paid, still, for
Article III Second (b) to take effect, the State must: give Blackhawk notice
of the royalty rate increase and give Blackhawk an opportunity for a hearing
on such increase. Blackhawk's posture is this: Failure to provide it with
notice and an opportunty to be heard is a deprivation of a property interest
without due process. The Division failed to provide any such notice and
opportunity for hearing.

The lower court, in its Memorandum Decision of February 24,
1988, Plateau Mining Co., et ai v. The Utah Division of State Lands and
Forestry, et ai, Civil No. 14890, recognized this complexity when it posed
these questions: "**at the beginning of the reporting quarter what is the
prevailing federal rate and who makes the determination, the lessor or the
lessee, and what factors are to be included in making a determination as to
what federal rate prevails and in what area is it prevelant? Who makes the
determination that the land in the state lease and the federal lease are
similar in character and what is the basis for determining similarity? What
time period is used to determine federal leases issued.. .at that time' and
who makes that determination? Even if the prevailing federal rate is
established, does it apply to the value of the coal removed' as stated in the
federal regulation or to the gross sales value' as used by the State Auditor in
his assessment, and who makes that determination?'' (at P. 5) These are
unanswered questions which compel the lower court to conclude that
"subparagraph (b) is not self-executing as to create a legal obligation on the
lessee since the identifiable factors necessary for self-execution could not
independently be ascertained by either party•". (Emphasis supplied) Ibid.
atP.6 (Addendum 6)
D. The State is estopped from retroactiveiy appiying the
prevaiiing Federairate.
Governmental immunity from estoppel is a derivative of the
doctrine conferring the sovereign entity with immunity from suit without its
consent. 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver §123 (1966); annot 1 A.L.R. 2d
338, 340. The modern trend in both legislative and judicial thinking is

toward the concept that the citizen has a right to expect the same standard
of honesty, justice and fair dealing in his contact with the state or other
political entity, which he is legally accorded in his dealings with other
individuals. Therefore, the rule against estopping a governmental body
should not be used by the state to obtain unjust enrichment or undeserved
gains at the expense of a citizen. Finch v. Mathews, 443 P.2d 833 (1968);
Edwards v. City ofBenton, 67 Wash. 2d 598, 409 P.2d 153 (1965)
Generally speaking, equitable estopplel must be cautiously
applied against the State if it is acting in its governmental capacity,
nevertheless, the State can be estopped whether acting in a governmental or
proprietary capacity. Celebrity Qub, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission,
602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979).
In Finch v. Matthews, supra, the court left little doubt as to the
extent to which the doctrine could be extended, saying:
The doctrine of equitable estoppel will be applied against the state or
against a municipality or other political entity when acting in its
governmental as well as when acting in its proprietary capacity, when
necessary to prevent a manifest injustice and the exercise of its
governmental powers will not be impaired thereby, (at page 842)
(Emphasis in the original)
There is no doubt that Blackhawk will suffer an injustice if the
State is permitted to deny the application of equitable estoppel; it will suffer
a material financial loss, simply because the State is attempting to
accomplish at this late date what it might have done at the time the lease
was ripe for readjustment. By applying the doctrine, there could be no
impairment of the State's government process.

There is nothing more coldly callous than the State's denial that
Biackhawk will suffer a material financial loss when it says that all costs are
passed on by Plaintiff to its parent companies and eventually the utilities
and consumers in the Midwest." (Brief of Appellants, P. 37) The State's
tardiness in handling the lease readjustment is to be paid for by some
unknown, faceless utility rate payer in the Midwest. What an incredible
rationalization!
The State complains that "The trial court erred when it rewrote
the parties' lease by limiting royalties to $ .15 per ton". (Brief of Appellants
at P. 11) This is a serious mischaracterization of the lower court's judgment.
That court was, we submit, adhering to the broad equitable
principle ennumerated in State eirel

Washington Paving Co. v. Clausen, 90

Wash. 450, 452, 156 P.2d 554 (1916):
We have repeatedly held that in its business relations with
individuals, the state must not expect more favorable treatment than
is fair between men. State exrei. Giiiette v. C/ausen, 44 Wash. 437,
441. 87 P. 498; Spokane Street Ry. Co. v. Spokane Faiis, 6 Wash. 521.
33 P. 1072; State ex rel Maddaugh v. Ritter, 14 Wash. 649, 650, 134
P. 492; Ettor v. [City of]Tacoma, 11 Wash. 267, 275, 137 P. 820. The
State in its dealings with individuals should be held to "resolute good
faith." State of[Indiana] v. Miik, (C.C.) 11 F.389.
The State argues that estoppel is applicable only in very limited
circumstances when the State is acting in its governmental capacity
(Appellants' brief, page 33) The State looks to Duchesne County v. Tax
Commission, 140 P.2d 335 (Utah 1943) and Justice Larsen's failure to find a
distinction between governmental and proprietary capacity and that Justice's
conclusion that everything the State does is governmental (Ibid, page 343).
Three other justices concurred in the result that the lands in question (State

school lands) are not taxable, but did not necessarily concur in Justice
Larsen's simplistic analysis (Wolfe, Chief Justice, McDonough, Justice, Wade,
Justice, each concurring in result only) (Ibid, pages 343, 344)
The majority of courts have refused to adopt Justice Larsen's
conclusion. In Celebrity, supra, this Court has looked with approval to the
case of Metropolitan Park, a District of Tacoma, v. State Department of
NaturaiResources, 539 P.2d 854 (Washington 1975) which unequivocally
stated that "when the state undertakes to dispose of public lands, either by
sale or lease, it then acts in its propietary capacity". (At page 858) In
Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (Utah 1975), the dissent of
Justice Maughn clearly expressed this view, in which he said: "Here the State
acts to dispose of public lands by lease. It thus acts in its proprietary
capacity, an equitable estoppel is a proper remedy." (Page 700)
In Radioffv. State, 116 Mich. App. 745, 323 NW2d 541,
remanded 330 NW2d 692 (Mich.), the State's actions in leasing land for
gravel were held to be proprietary in nature.
Morgan's importance here lies in this Court's holding that
estoppel was available against the Board of State Lands if the following
elements were present:
Estoppel arises when a party (defendant Board) by
his acts, representations, or admissions, or by his silence when he
ought to speak, intentionally or through cuipable negiigence induces
another (plaintiffs) to believe certain facts to exist and that such other
(plaintiffs) acting with reasonable prudence and diligence, relies and
acts thereon so that he will suffer an injustice if the former (land
board) is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. (Emphasis
added) (Page 697)

This Court, in Celebrity, supra, quoted with approval West v.
Department of Social and Health Services, 21 Wash. App. 577, 586 P.2d 516
(1978) wherein that court said:
The elements essential to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel
are:
(1) An admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim
afterwards asserted,
(2) Action by the other party on the faith of such admission,
statement or act, and
(3) Injury to such party resulting from allowing the first party
to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement, or act. (at page
518)
All of the elements for estoppel are here:
(a) By its acts, representations, admissions and silence,
the Division led Blackhawk to believe the proper royalty rate was $0.15 per
ton throughout the audit period;
(b) The Division was fully aware, at the time of the
attempted readjustment, that the rate paid was $0.15 per ton;
(c) Throughout the period of attempted readjustment the
Division accepted, without comment, the royalty payments at $0.15 per ton;
(d) At no time during the attempted readjustment did
the Division allege an underpayment of royalty or suggest the rate should be
set in pursuance of Article III, Second(b);
(e) Blackhawk s clarifying letter of January 7, 1982,
reiterating its intent to continue to pay royalty at the rate of $0.15 was met
with complete silence by the Division; the Division, however, continued to

accept payments at said rate and the Division's silence continued for three
and one-half more years until the Audit Report;
(f) Blackhawk relied in good faith upon the impression
conveyed by the State through its conduct (its silence);
(g) Blackhawk acted at all times with reasonable
diligence and prudence; and
(h) Blackhawk will suffer a serious and irreparable
damage if the State is permitted to deny the existence of these facts.
Because the State failed in its readjustment efforts, it should be
estopped from using this avenue to accomplish that which it could not
achieve otherwise; the State is estopped from retroactively escalating the
royalty rate and demanding payment of alleged past due royalties, plus
interest and penalties.
E. By its failure to properly invoke the Federal prevailing rate
clause in a proper and timely fashion, the State is barred by laches, waiver
and the Statute of Limitations
Laches arises from a delay coupled with the resultant
disadvantage to the other party because of the delay. Papanikolas Brothers
Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Association, 535 P-2d 1256
(1975)
The elements necessary to support laches are : A lack of
diligence on the part of the Defendant (the State in this case); an injury to
Plaintiff (Blackhawk in this case) due to such lack of diligence. Both
elements are present in this case. The Division waited an unconscionable
three and one-half years before demanding payment of added royalties;

Blackhawk had mined coal to comply with contractual arrangements with
others depending on the $0.15 per ton royalty. Coal was mined which
otherwise might not have been mined at a higher royalty, and interest was
demanded by the State at rates as high as eighteen percent per annum.
Because of its protracted delay, it would be most inequitable to permit the
State to maintain such claims.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.
American Savings & Loan Association v. Biomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 445
P.2d 1 (1965). The following three elements must be present to establish
waiver:
1. A right, benefit or advantage must have been in
existence at the time the waiver occurred;
2. The waiving party must not have had knowledge of
the right, and;
3. The waiver may be expressed or implied, but the
waiving party must have intended to relinquish his right. (Ibid, at 3) (See
also Phoenix Insurance Company v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 61 P.2d 308, 312
(1936) All three elements are present in this case.
Assuming arguendo that Article III, Second (b) was not void
but was sufficient to have some legal effect, then the State would be said to
have a right to apply the escalation provision. Obviously, the State had
knowledge of the existence of the escalation provision because it attempted
to enforce it. The intent to waive that right may be express or implied.
Silence constitutes conduct which evidences an intent to waive if there is a
duty to speak. Daiton v. LeBIanc, 350 F.2d 95 (10th Cir. 1965). The Division

had a responsibility to speak, especially in the light of Blackhawk's counsel's
letter of January 7, 1982, which stated in out-and-out terms that the
escalation provision was inapplicable and that the royalty would continue to
be paid at the regular rate. The only inference that can be drawn from three
and one-half years of silence is that the State had waived it right to increase
the royalty rate. It must not be forgotten that the State quietly continued to
accept the quarterly royalty payments—at the regular rate—without a
murmer. This smacks of an ongoing waiver or relinquishment of the State's
right (assuming, of course, such right ever existed).
In its argument, the State has lost sight of the fact that the
blame for any loss, if any there is, can be laid at its own feet. The State, by
contract, had the right to readjust the terms of the lease at the expiration of
the twenty-year term. It sat on its hands and did nothing. When it
awakened to the fact that it was tardy and had lost that opportunity, it
started on a new tack; it would amend the lease —another way of
accomplishing a readjustment. The holding in Rosebud CoalSoles Company,
supra, brought an end to this belated stratagem and that effort was
abandoned, but with the fatal caveat contained in the Blackhawk letter of
January 4, 1982, that "they (Blackhawk) may continue to operate under the
original lease agreement until otherwise advised." Blackhawk was not
"otherwise advised" until nearly four years later when the State brought
forth the Audit Report.
Utah Code §78-12-23(2) provides that:
An action, upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an
instrument in writing, except those mentioned in §78-12-22

must be brought within six years. If a cause of action commences upon the
breach of the contract, the Statute of Limitation begins to run when the
breach occurs. A'ouiis v. Standard Oil Company of California, 746 P.2d 1182
(Utah App. 1987); Upland Industries Corporation v. Pacific Gamble Robinson
Company, 684 P.2d 638 (Utah 1984).
The State alleges that Blackhawk underpaid royalties beginning
with the first quarter of 1979. This must be based upon the writing (State
Lease and Article III, Second (bl) and the breach in 1979. Thus, the State
would have been required to bring its action within six years of the alleged
breach. Instead, it saw the light of day in the form of the State's
counterclaim in this cause on August 22, 1986. Although the State was fully
aware of the rate being paid, there was not a demand for payment until May
16, 1986.2 ^ would be farfetched, indeed, to expect the State to claim, in
good faith, that it was unaware of the alleged underpayment of royalty until
completion of the audit report in October of 1985. It would have to be the
State's contention that it knew there was an underpayment, but that
underpayment was not quantified until October 1985. Thus, the Defendants'
claim for royalties is late; the State is barred by the Statute of Limitations.
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The audit royalty report was released October 15, 1985, (R. 304) under
cover of the Director's letter of even date which noted the findings and
allowed for a reconsideration request if Blackhawk disagreed with the
findings. The Division declined to make any readjustments to the report and
by letter of March 27, 1986, (R.313) demanded payment within thirty days.
On April 21. 1986, the Utah Supreme Court issued a decision in Adkins v.
The Division of State Lands and Forestry, 719 P.2d 524. As a result of this
decision, the Division recinded the demand letter of March 27, 1986 and
issued a new demand letter of May 16, 1986. (R. 314)

F. The State's attempt to impose interest andpenalties cannot
be legally enforced.
It is Blackhawk's position that the Division lacks the authority
to impose interest penalties. The State has attempted to impose intrest rates
ranging from six percent to eighteen percent applicable to the alleged
underpaid royalty.3 If no royalties are due, no interest can be owing. Even
if underpaid royalties are found owing, for a quarter such as the quarter
commencing October 1, 1981 and ending December 31, 1981, the State
nevertheless cannot impose interest thereon. Absent a contractual provision,
pre-judgment interest can be imposed only by a trial court after a final
determination.
Article I of the State Lease provides that: "This lease is granted
subject in all respects to and under the conditions of the laws of the State of
Utah and existing rules and regulations and such operating rules and
regulations as may hereafter be approved and adopted by the State Land
Board." (Emphasis added) (Addendum 1)
§65-1-96, Utah Code, provides, in essence, that ail mineral
leases issued prior to the effective date of the act shall continue for the term

3 For the purposes hereof, we have assumed that the six percent rate
assessed from January 1, 1979 to June 30, 1981, and the ten percent rate
assessed from July 1, 1981 to November 30, 1982, represent the statutory
pre-judgment rates for the periods involved; that the eighteen percent rate
represents the rate under Rule 3(c) of the Rules and Regulations of the Utah
Division of State Lands and Forestry adopted November 4, 1982, imposing a
fee of 1.5 percent per month on all "outstanding overdue royalty".
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specified therein and "shall be subject to the conditions and provisions
contained therein;..." Thus, the State Lease was subject to those rules and
regulations in effect on February 16, 1960 (the date of issuance of the State
Lease) and "operating" rules and regulations adopted thereafter by the
Board.
The lease clearly differentiates "operating rules and regulations"
from "existing rules and regulations". Operating rules and regulations relate
to the operation of the leasehold. Neither "operating" nor "operation" is a
term of art but in most instances appears to refer to activities leading to the
production of oil and gas, thus, it has has been held not to include the
payment of royalties. Bouterie v. Kleinpeter, 258 La. 605, 245 So.2d 548;
see also Adolph v. Sterns, 235 Kan. 622, 684 P.2d 372 "Operating rules and
regulations" do not include royalty matters let alone interest on royalty
underpayments. Royalty terms are financial terms not operating terms. If
the board had the power to alter the financial terms of a lease by the simple
expedient of setting new rules and regulations, a lessee would become the
captive of pure bureaucratic whim and fancy—a lessee would lose all
contractual certainty.
As we have noted, there was no rule or regulation in existence
when the State Lease was issued. The terms of the Lease preclude the
application of Rule 3(c) which was promulgated in 1982 (twenty-two years
after the lease issued). Further, the 1982 rule does not govern or relate to a
lessee's operations on the land. The 1982 interest rule cannot be applied to
any royalty deficiency which could be assessed under the State Lease.

Putting the legal arguments aside for the moment, and looking
at the situation in light of simple fairness, the State should not be permitted
to impose an eighteen percent interest charge. Generally, interest simply
reflects the "time value" of money; interest as contemplated under Rule 3(c)
reflects something more—a sense of the punitive. What Rule 3(c) says to the
lessee subject to the rule is, if you don't pay your royalty on time, interest at
1.5 percent per month will accrue. Where, as here, the State tries to
retroactively adjust the royalty rate without notice of underpayment to the
lessee, the imposition of an eighteen percent interest rate is simply
inequitable and unreasonable.
G. The States royaltypolicyrule is invalid because the State
failed to comply with the Utah A dministrative Rule Making Act.

The lower court held that a legally binding lease cannot be
altered or added to by rules and regulations adopted subsequently. (R.) The
court's ruling is to the effect that the State, in formulating and announcing its
royalty policy, must follow the procedure specified in the 1985 Utah
Administrative Rule Making Act, UCA §63-46(a)-3 (1986). A "rule" is
defined by the Act as being ".. .a statement made by an agency that applies
to a general class of persons, rather than specific persons and: (i) implements or interprets policy made by statute; or (ii) prescribes the policy of
the agency in the absence of express statutory policy; or (iii) prescribes the
administration or the agency's functions or describes its organization,
procedures and operations". §63-46(a)-8(i)

The States royalty policy requiring an eight percent royalty
rate is a rule within the contemplation of the cited statute and cannot,
therefore, be enforced retroactively, in the present or prospectively, without
compliance with the rule making process.
In Williams v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah
1986) the Commission had, in 1962, granted a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity to Mobile Telephone, Inc. to operate a two-way
mobile telephone and a paging system. From 1962 to 1983, the Commission
granted other, similar certificates. The Federal Communications Commission
deregulated radio frequencies in paging services and a given number of
frequencies were alloted to Utah on a first-come-first-serve basis. In 1983,
a company inquired of the Commission whether a Certificate of Necessity
was required, and in a written response, the Commission answered in the
negative. This constituted a reversal of the Commissions earlier policy and
was a relinquishment of the Commissions jurisdiction over one-way radios.
The petitioners in the case argued that the letter constituted either a "rule"
under the meaning of the Rule Making Act or an "order" within the meaning
of the Public Utilities Act. UCA 1953 §54-7-13; Repl. Vol. 6A 1974. The
Commission argued that it was not a rule making within the meaning of the
statute because it did not have general applicability.
This Court acknowledged that there are situations when an
agency may state a new policy in informal adjudications, but the problem
was different where an agency, through adjudication, makes a change in
clear law "as when it overrules a batch of its own decisions, especially if
private parties have acted in reliance on the overruled decisions." Quoting

from K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, §7.25 at 122 (2nd Edition,
1978) This Court concluded in Williams, supra, that the Commission's
decision was generally applicable; the decision altered the rights of all
certificate holders; the letter interpreted the scope of the Commission's
regulatory powers through "interpreting the law"; and, in so acting, the
Commission made a "change in clear law". The court ruled that:
"Under all these circumstances we conclude that the Commission
cannot reverse its long settled position regarding the scope of its
jurisdiction and announce a fundamental policy change without
following the requirements of the Utah Administrative Rule Making
Act. Ibid, at 766-77
In applying the rationale of the Wiiiiams case here, it can be
concluded that the State's royalty policy announced in 1985 was a rule. In
the absence of a compliance with the Rule Making Act, it is void. The State's
would-be policy affects all state lessees holding coal leaes of the nature
under discussion here; thus, it affects a "class of persons". As stated, the
policy represents a departure or "change in the clear law".
Until it complies with the Rule Making Act, the State is
precluded from enforcing its would-be policy, retroactively or otherwise.
CONCLUSION
The State Lease was issued in 1960 and no question was raised
by the State as to the royalty rate payable thereunder until the lease
provision was before the Division and the Board in 1981 and it was decided
to attempt a tardy readjustment of the lease itself. The royalty rate was not

increased; the rate remained at $0.15 per ton of coal produced. The lease
provision came up again in 1982 when the Division attempted an increase of
the "annual minimum royalty'. Again, the royalty rate was not increased.
Relying on the original lease royalty rate and the silence of the
State, Blackhawk continued to mine coal and pay royalties at the rate of
$0.15 per ton of coal produced—all without objection from the State. Now,
the State is trying to do something it hadn't been able to do; retroactively
invoke an ambiguous lease provision which, unfortunately for the State, has
already been waived.
If the State insists that the law requires the receipt of full value
from the disposition of trust lands, then the simple answer is that the State
has failed under the law. If the State complains that the "contract created by
the trial court runs directly counter to the law and public policy of this State"
then it has conveniently blinded itself to the fact that the State created the
contract; the trial court merely found its terms so vague and ambiguous as
to be completely unenforceable. (Brief of Appellant P. 19) The State
denounces the lower court saying that "The Court should not delete or
rewrite the contract." (Brief of Appellant P. 23) The States insistance
notwithstanding, the court did not "create" or "rewrite" the contract; the
court merely concluded that it could not make a silk purse out of this sows
ear—that is neither creating nor rewriting the contract. But on the other
hand, if there were ambiguity, then the State would have the court
"interpret or clarify the ambiguous provision". (Brief of Appellant P. 23)
The State is asking the lower court to abandon common sense and with some
sort of judicial legerdemain "create" an understandable contract provision.

The very thing the State complains of in the lower court is what it now asks
this Court to do.
The stakes are not inconsiderable; the prize the State seeks is
$3,150,775.64—a tidy sum in anybody's lexicon. But, for the reasons
assigned herein, it would be unconscionable and unjust for the State to
prevail. The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of October, 1988.

"WIFffiwl
By

•gii

Attorneyslfor Blackfliawk Coal Company
136 SoutWMain Street, Suite 330
Salt Lake City. Utih 84101
PLAINTIFIWPELLEE
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MINERAL LEASE APPLICATION

MINERAL LEASE NO.
GRANT:

NO.,

1 O 1 4

0

School

m&:

Utah

State

Lease for

C
?<fimv*ry

16th...

THIS INDENTURE OF LEASE A N D AGREEMENT entered mo in duplicate this
day of ..
by arid between the STATE LAND BOARD, acting in ochaif of the State of Utah, hereinafter called the Lessor, and

f

wJ8P[

CAHEON DF/QiOPiENT CCMPAKY
P. 0 . Box 506
Helpar* Utah

party of the second part, hereinafter called the Lessee, under and Pursuant to Title 65, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
WITNESSETH: That the Lessor, in consideration of the rents and royalties to be r^'d and the covenants to he observed by the Lessee, as hereinafter set forth, does hereby grant and lease to the Lessee the exclusive right and privilege to mine, remove, and dispose of all of the
said minerals in, upon, or under the following described tract of land situated in

vWDOU

County, State of Utah, to-wit:

All of Section Thirty-two (32), Tcrwnshlp Twalvo (12) South-, Rang*? Illno (?) Ea*t#
Salt Laka Meridian,

containing a total of
6/<0«UU
acres, more or less, together with the ri;;hr to use and occupy so much of the surface of said land as
may be required for all purposes reasonably incident to the mining, removal, apd di*po*nl of *aid minerals, according to the provisions of this
lease, for the period ending ten year; after the first day of lanuary next succeeding the date hereof and as lone thereafter as said minerals may
be produced in commercial quantities' from said lands, or Lessee sh:ill continue to make the payments required by Article III hereof, upon
condition that nt the end of each twenty (20) year period succccdin'4 the first diiy of the year in which tlvs lease is issued, such readjustment
of terms and conditions may be made as the Lessor mov dctcimme to be necessary M the interest of the Stnic.
ARTlCUl

I

This lease is granted subject in all respects to and under the renditions of the laws of the State of Utah and exisring rules and regulations
and such operating rules and regulations as may be hereafter approved and adopted by the State Land Board.

ART/C/E 11
This lease covers only the mining, removal, and d» posnl of the minerals specified in this lease, but the Lessee shall promptly notify the
tfye Lessor of the discovery of any minerals excepting those enumerated herein.
ARTICLE III
The Lessee, in consideration of the granting of the rights and p-ivilegc. afores-ud, hereby covenants and agree*, as follows:
FIRST: To pay to the Lessor as rental for the land covered by this lc.i-c the sum uf fifty (50) cents rcr acre per annum. All such annual
payments of rental shall be made in advance on the 2nd day of January of each year, except the

i

rental which is payable

on the execution of this lease. All rentals s>hall be credited against royalties for the year in which they accrue.
SECOND: To pay to Lessor quarterly, on or before the 15th day of the month succeeding each quarter, royalty
(a) at the rate of 15£ per ton of 2CC0 lbs. of coal produced from the leaded premises and othciwi^e disposed of, or
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the beginning of thi» quarter for which payment is being made, for federal lessees of land of similar character under coal leases issued by the United States at that time,

If the coal produced from
product only, provided Lessee
ascertained and complies with
coal originating from the leased

the leased premises is washed before sale or other disposition by Lessee, Lessee mav pay royalty on the washed
maintains accurate record by which the weight of washed coal originating from the leased premises can be
all regulations and directives i.v-ued by Lessor to prevent waste and to insure that royalty is paid on all washed
premises.

THIRD: To prepare and forward to the State Land Office, on or before the 15th day of the month next succeeding the quarter in which
the material is produced, a certified statement of the amount of production of all of the leased substances disposed of from said lands, and
such other additional information as the State Land Board may from time to time require.
FOURTH: To keep at the mine of fire clear, accurate and detailed maps en tr.vur; cloth, en a scale not more than 50 feet to the inch,
of the workings in each section of the leased lands an I on the Kinds adjacent, said maps to be coordinated with reference to a public land corner so that they can be readily and correctly superimposed, and t> fumi. h to the Lessor annually, or upon demand, certified copies of such
maps and such written statements of operations as may be called for. All surveys shall be made by a licensed engineer and all maps certified
to by him.
FIFTH; Not to fence or otherwise make tnaccessibc to stock any watering place on the premises without first obtaining the written consent
of Lessor, nor to permit or contribute to the pollution of any surface or riitaurfncc water available or capable of hcing made available for domestic
or irrigation use.
SIXTH: Not to assign this 1-asc or any interest therein, nor sublet any portion of the leased premises, or any of the rights and privileges
herein granted, without the written consent of the Lessor being first had and obtained.

ARTICLE IV
The Lessor hereby excepts and reserves from the operation of this lease:
FIRST: The right to permit for joint or several use such c isements or rights-of-way upon, through, or in the land hereby leased as may
be necessary or appropriate to the working of these or other lands belonging to or administered by the Lessor containing mineral deposits
or for other use.
SECOND: The right to use, lease, sell, or otherwise dispose of the surfarc of said lands or any part thereof, under existing State laws
or laws hereafter enacted, insofar as said surface is not necessary for the Lcsee in the mining, removal, or disposal of the leased substances therein, and to lease mineral deposits, other than those leased hereby, which may be contained in said lands so long as the recovery of such deposits does not unreasonably interfere with Lessee's rights herein granted.

ARTICLE V
Upon failure or refusal of the Lessee to accept the readjustment of terms and conditions demanded by the Lessor at the end of any twentyyear period, such failure or refusal thall work a forfeiture of the lease und the same shall be canceled.

ARTICLE VI
In case of expiration, forfeiture, surrender or other termination of this lease, all underground timbering supports, shaft linings, rails and
other installations necessary for the support of underground workings o( any mines, and all rails or head frames and all installations which
cannot be removed without permanent injury' to the premises and all constriction and equipment installed underground to provide ventilation
for any min^s, upon or in the said lands shall be and remain a part of the tcalty .aul shall revert to the Lesror without further consideration or
compensation r.nd shall be left by the Lessee in the lands.
All personal property of Lessee located within or upon the said lands and all buildings, machinery, equipment and tools (other than
installations to become the property of Lessor as above provided), shall be and remain the propc.ty of Lc-:;ce and Lessee shall be entitled
and may, within six (6) months ahcr such expiration, forfeiting, surrender or other termination of sr.id lease, or wi.hin such extension
time as may be granted by I essor, remove from the said lands such personal property and improvements, other than those items which
to remain the property of the Lessor ns above provided.

the
to,
of
are

Lessee shall, upon termination, of this lease or abandonment of the leased premise for any reason, seal to Lessor's satisfaction all or such
part of the mine openings on the premises as Lessor shall request be sealed. •

ARTICLE

Vll

It 6nall be the responsibility of the leasee to slope the sides of nil operations of a surface nature to an angle of not less than 45* or to
erect a barrier around such operation as rhe State Land Board mav tcquire. Such sloping or fencing <hnll become a normal part of the operation of the lease so as to keep pace with such operation to the extent that such operation shall not constitute a hazard.

ARTICLE VIII
Lessee shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any water rights acquired for use upon the leased premises except with Lessor's written permission. Upon termination of this lease for any reason, all such rights acquired by application to the Utah Slate Tngineer shall revert to the
Lessor as an appurtenance to the leased premises, and all such rights acquired by other means shall be offered to Lessor in writing for purchase
at Lessee's acquisition costs, provided that Lessor shall be deemed to have rejected such offer if it docs not accept the same within thirty
days after receipt thereof.

ARTICLE IX
All of the terms, covenants, conditions, and obligations in this lease contained, shall be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators,
and assigns of the Lessee.
ARTICLE X
Lessee may terminate this lease at any time upon giving three (3) months' notice in writing to the Lessor and upon payment of all
rents and royalties and other sums due and payable to the Lessor, and upon complying with the terms of this lease with respect to the preservation of the workings in such order and condition as to permit of the continued orvmnnn r,( tU» \*»%*~A _..,•_:,—

STATE OF UTAH
STATE if

) BOARD

fly. :/..44v^A^/-f----4---/.^^
r

I

DIRECTOR
LESSOR

/

C'->noN PF-VF;i.OPT-'!FivT COMPANY, a Utah

P^esi'USr.t

},,

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF
On the

LESSEE'S INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
pci.sonn'.ly appeared before me .

19...

day of

the signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that
Given under my hand and seal this

-

executed Hie same.

19...—...

Notary Public, residing at:

STATE OF UTAH

On the

„

day of

My commission Expires:

COUNTY OF

LESSEE

LESSEE'S CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

CARBON
I 9 i h day of

MZZSlL

19...^?...^ personally appeared before me .. ...

Jimer>

who being duly swom did say that he is an officer of ...C.:lI^b.0.n....D.C.y.eJ.^i^.li?.ILt....^..C^?J.,.:?..^Jf.
,Tn"|Ar

in behalf of said corporation by resolution of its Board of Directors, and said ....
edged to me that said corporation executed the same.

Given under my hand and seal this

.,.«.!...1.V.

day of

,T

T

. ^ia-nnti

and that said instrument was signed
1 *\ !T M T"1 "^" X

1

!..t .'.

acknowl-

19.........

My commission Expires:

Notary Public, residing at: H e l r e r ,

Utah

2/9/60

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
On the
r.:.i..:.f.— day of ''"X:
'...'...'
.:... 19...C, personally appeared before me Frank J. Allen, who being by me duly sworn did
say that he is the Director of the State Land Board of the State of Ut;ih and that said instrument was signed in behalf of said Board by resolution of the Board, and said Frank J. Allen acknowledged to me that said Board executed the fame in behalf of the State of Utah.

Given under my hand and seal this

day of

^

£LL£I.L...

o;
My commission Expires: -r%* / ^S„/*.-

J^~

\9jfS"

•K/
,4,:

Notary Public, residing at;

- • .*2^_,._*

DIVISION OF STATE LANDS & FORESTRY
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
ROOM 411 EMPIRE BUILDING
231 EAST 400 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
(801)533-5381

Scott M.Matheson
Governor
Gordon E. Harmston
Executive

Director

Dept. of Natural

William K. Dinehart
Director

January 14, J981

CERTIFIED MAIL NO. 667150
Franklin Real Estate Company
Attn: Mineral Land Dept.
2 Broadway
New York, NY
10004

RE:

ML 18148

Gentlemen:
The above numbered lease was issued February 16, I960, with provision that the
lessor may readjust terms and conditions as may be in the interest of the
State following each 20 year period. Since the original lease has now
concluded its 20 year period, it is lessors desire and intent to amend this
lease to conform with our current standard lease form for coal, copies of
which are enclosed*
As you may appreciate, rental and minimum royalty rates are much different
than in the old lease agreement of 20 years ago. Upon amendment our lease
agreement will retain the anniversary date of the original lease but rentals
and royalties as well as all other provisions will be in accordance with the
new lease form.
Please execute and return both copies of the new lease agreement within 30
days for our confirmation. We will then return one copy for your records and
you will have another 20 years on lands covered by the lease.
Please contact me should you have any questions regarding this readjustment.
Sincerely yours,

JOHN T. BLAKE
MINERAL RESOURCE SPECIALIST

jf

BOARD MEMBERS

Reiourcet

ADDENDU]
STATE OF UTAH
NATURAL RESOURCES & ENERGY
State Lands & Forestry

Scott M. Matheson. Governor
Temple A. Reynolds. Executive Director
William K. Dmehart, Division Director

100 State Office Building • Salt Lake City. UT 84114 • 801-533-5381

January 4, 1932

CERTIFIED MAIL NO. 984491
Blackhawk Coal Company
c/o Hugh C. Garner & Associates
Attn: Hugh C. Garner
Suite 1100 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
RE: ML 18143
Dear Mr. Garner:
I am in receipt of your letter of December 28, 1981. You are correct in your
understanding of the Land Board meeting of July 8, 1981. The Attorney
General's Office, however, is not prepared to issue a formal opinion on this
subject at this time. Consequently, we are not demanding that Blackhawk Coal
Company accept readjustment of the lease at this time.
My letter of December 11, 1981, was merely an invitation for Blackhawk Coal
Company to amend this lease with our current standard lease form, concurrent
with the new lease year, at the readjusted royalty authorized by the Land
Board. As pointed out in my letter, the proposed lease amendment has the
advantage of allowing the lessee to pay an annual minimum royalty of $3.00 per
acre in lieu of the requirement for yearly commercial production. Should
Blackhawk Coal Company choose to reject my invitation for lease amendment,
they may continue to operate under the original lease agreement until
otherwise advised.

Board/Jack Sawyers. Chairman. Southwestern •Warren Haycock, Bear River • Chandler St. John. Mountamlands
Max Williams. Central • Paul Rattle. Southeastern • Hollis Hulllnger. Uintah Basin • George Buzlanis, Wasatch
Dr. Walter O. Talbot. Ex officio

CERTIFIED MAIL* NO.'984491
Blackhawk Coal Company
c/o Hugh C,:< Garner & Associates
January 4- l98?
Page 2

Blackhawk Coal Company, as are all State mineral lessees, is expected to fully
comply with all the terms and conditions of their State lease* As you are
aware, the original lease, ML 18148, was issued for a primary term of ten
years. It may only be extended from year to year beyond that primary term by
commercial production. We look forward to receiving royalty payment on
commercial production each and e^ery year so long as lessee continues to
operate under the original lease agreemnent. Further, we expect to receive
such future royalty payments at the same rate prevailing for similar federal
coal leases in the area.
Please advise your client accordingly.
Sincerely yours,
(J OOHN T. BLAKE
MINERALS RESOURCE SPECIALIST
JT3/mh
cc: Mr. Dick Dewsnip
Assistant Attorney General

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BLACKHAWK COAL COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY, RALPH
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND
FORESTRY, THE UTAH BOARD OF
STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY, THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, DEE HANSEN,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES,
Defendants .

MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil No. 14943

The plaintiff has moved the Court for partial
summary judgment and has supported the same by their Memorandum
of Legal Points and Authorities, Affidavits and supporting
documents.

The defendants have objected to the Motion and have

filed their Memorandum of Legal Points and Authorities and
supporting documents and Affidavits.

The Court finds that

there is no dispute as to the material facts in this case and
has concluded therefrom that the plaintiff is entitled to
partial summary judgment as prayed for and grants the
plaintiff's Motion.
The factual situation is nearly identical to the
fact situation as shown in Carbon Case No. 14390, Plateau
Mining Company v. The Division of State Lands and Forestry, et a

and the Court has attached hereto a copy of its opinion in that
case to show the reasoning of the Court and the legal analysis
used by the Court in reaching its decision in this case.
The factual situation in this case is more supportive
of plaintifffs motion than were the facts in the Plateau Mining
case in that there was an attempt by the defendants to
renegotiate the lease in question to a percentage of gross
value of coal produced in 1981.

That attempt was never pursued

by defendants and even withdrawn in January of 1982.

Plaintiff,

at that time, was informed by John T. Blake, Mineral Resources
Specialist of the State of Utah, Natural Resources and Energy
Department, Division of State Lands and Forestry, as follows:
"Should Blackhawk Coal Company choose to reject my invitation
for lease adjustment:, they may continue to operate under the
original Lease Agreement until otherwise advised."
The plaintiff responded in a letter to Mr. Blake on
January 7, 1982, as follows: "Blackhawk will continue to pay to
the State, on a quarterly basis, the royalty of $.15 per ton in
compliance with Article III(a) of the original Lease Agreement,
since the provisions of Article 111(b) of this Agreement are
inapplicable at the present time."
Thereafter, plaintiff paid and defendant accepted
without comment or objection the $.15 a ton in accordance with
Article Ill(a) of the Lease.
2

The attorney for the plaintiff is directed to
prepare a formal judgment in accordance with this decision.
DATED this

J^-/ ^ day of April, 1988.

*!&'

OYD BUNNELL, Diserrct Judge

3

HAY 11 1283

Hugh C. G a r n e r - 1161
HUGH C . GARNER & ASSOCIATES, P . C .
136 S o u t h Main S t r e e t
S u i t e 700

Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-5660
A. John Davis - 0825
PRUITT, GUSHEE & FLETCHER
36 South State Street
Suite 1850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (301) 531-8446
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BLACKHAWK COAL COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.

*

THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY, RALPH
MILES, Director of the
Division of State Lands and
Forestry, THE UTAH BOARD OF
STATS LANDS AND FORESTRY, THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, DEE HANSEN,
Executive Director of the Utah
Department of Natural
Resources ,

JUDGMENT

*
*

*

Civil No. 14943

*
*

*
*

Defendants.
Plaintiff has filed its Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, together with its Supporting Memorandum of Points
and Authorities; Defendants have filed their Memorandum in

2
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion.

Plaintiff is represented by

Hugh C. Garner; Defendants are represented by their counsel Gayle
F. McKeachnie and Clark B. Allred.

The court having considered

the memoranda and exhibits submitted by the parties and having
previously, on April 21, 1988, issued its Memorandum Decision on
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
NOW THEREFORE, HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as
follows:
1.

Plaintiff owes no royalties, penalties or interest

to Defendants on State of Utah coal lease No. ML-18148 as
demanded in Defendants1 October 15, 1985 Royalty Audit Report.
2.

The judgment signed by this court in this case is a

final order and judgment from which an appeal may proceed.
3. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorneys1
fees in connection with this case.
DATED t h i s

^
/ / J
JZl

,

* /^Zi

day o f - ^ p r i > ;

1988.

BOYD BOWWELL

I s t r i c t — C o u r t Judg<=/
7

/^

3
The above judgment was prepared by Hugh C. Garner of
and for Hugh C. Garner & Associates, P.C., attorney for
Plaintiff, and was, prior to execution fay the court and pursuant
to Rule 2.9, Rules of Practice in the District Courts and Circuit
Courts of the State of Utah, submitted to the following on this
26th day of April, 1938.
David L. Wilkinson, Esq.
David S. Christensen, Esq.
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Gayle F. McKeachnie, Esq.
Clark B. Allred, Esq.
Nielsen & Senior
363 East Main Street
Vernkl, Utah 84078

ADDENDUM 6

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
1
PLATEAU MINING COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation, and
)1
)
CYPRUS WESTERN COAL EQUIPMENT
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation,]
Plaintiffs,
vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

]
;

THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY; RALPH
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND
FORESTRY; THE UTAH BOARD OF
STATE LANDS AMD FORESTRY; THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES; DEE HANSEN,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES,
Defendants.

]
!
]
]
]
]
]
!
]
]
]

Civil No. 14890

]

The plaintiff seeks a partial summary judgment from
the Court declaring that the royalty provision contained in the
State Lease of the defendants is ambiguous and that it should
be construed in light of the parties course of performance;
that the lease is not self-executing so as to place a legaL
obligation on plaintiffs to pay a higher rate of royalty after
the State accepted without qualification the payment of the
stated rate of $.15 per ton of coal produced; that the
defendants may not retroactively apply their new policy
imposing a royalty rate of 8%; that the defendants are estopped

from demanding payment of royalties on coal mined during the
audit period at a rate higher than that paid by plaintiffs and
accepted by defendants; that the defendants have waived their
right to demand a higher royalty rate than the one accepted
during the audit period; and that the ruling of the State
relative to imposing interest and penalties cannot be legally
enforced.
The defendants have objected to the granting of the
Motion and have submitted their own Motion for Summary judgment
asking the Court to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state
a cause of action; ordering the plaintiff, Plateau Mining
Company, to pay the delinquent royalty payment as determined on
the basis of 8% of gross sales value during the audit period;
ordering that the plaintiff, Plateau Mining Company, owes
interest on delinquent royalty payments at a rate set by the
Board of State Lands and, further, ordering that the plaintiff,
Plateau Mining Company, owes penalties on delinquent royalties
pursuant to the regulation set by the 3oarc,
Each of the parties have submitted their Memorandums
of Legal Points and Authorities and have presented to the Court
Affidavits and Exhibits which the Court has read and considered
and the Court heard oral arguments from the parties on February
16, 1988, and took this matter under advisement and rules on
the Motions as hereinafter stated.
-2-

Certain undisputed facts are, for the most part,
agreed upon by the parties as set forth in their respective
memorandums, and the Court will not attempt to detail all of
those undisputed facts.

There is no dispute as to the fact

that the plaintiff, Plateau, and their predecessors in interest
mined coal under a lease from the State of Utah during the
period April 1, 1979, to December 31, 1984, referred to as the
"audit period"; that the Lease was entered into on March 15,
1955, and that the Lease provides as follows:
"Article III, Second: To pay to Lessor quarterly, on
or before the 15th day of the month succeeding each quarter,
royalty
(a) at the rate of 15c per ton of 2000 lbs of coal
produced from the leased premises and sold or otherwise
disposed of, or
(b) at the rate prevailing at the beginning of the
quarter for which payment is being made, for federal leases of
land of similar character under coal leases issued by the
United States at that time,
whichever is higher.

..."

That the lease was on a standard form provided by
and prepared by the State Land Board, and that throughout the
audit period the plaintiff, Plateau, or their predecessors in
interests, filed quarterly with the lessor (State) on a form
provided by the State a report of the coal mined under the
Lease and a calculation of the royalty due on the basis of 15C
per ton.

The payment was received and retained by the State

without question or objection throughout the audit period and
prior thereto from sometime in 1965.

The royalty reporting form was provided by the Utah
Board of State Lands and under the title Royalty Data it has
two columns.

One is headed c/T Basis, and the other is headed

Percentage Basis.

Plateau and their predecessors in interest

filled in the column entitled c/T Basis and paid the amount of
royalty shown to be due under that column at 15C per ton and
left the other column blank.
After the term of the lease had expired, December
1984, in approximately February of 1985, the State undertook,
for the first time, an audit of the royalty payments.

The

audit was completed on or about May 29, 1985, and a demand was
sent to the plaintiffs for delinquent royalties in October of
1985.
It was the conclusion of the audit that the federal
government, during the audit period, was imposing a royalty on
coal leases of 8% of the value of the coal removed.

Based upon

the audit, the State made a demand upon the plaintiffs for the
payment of an additional $2,991,613.44 for delinquent
royalties, interest and penalties based upon 8% of Gross Sales
Value of coal removed.
Based upon an examination of the Lease and the
parties attempts to comply with its terms, and particularly the
expressed attitude of the various individuals whose
responsibility it was to enforce the Lease for and on behalf of
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the State, the Court finds that as a matter of law the royalty
provision as contained in Article III, paragraph Second (b) of
the lease is ambiguous.
The royalty provision is divided into two parts.
Part (a) is definite and precise and is capable of definitive
determination and provides for 15C per ton on coal produced
from the leased premises.
Part (b) leaves the amount due based on several
faccors not immediately capable of definitive determination.
The ambiguity arises as much from what is not stated and
provided as from what is stated.

In other words, at the

beginning of the reporting quarter what is the prevailing
federal rate and who makes that determination, the lessor or
the lessee, and what factors are to be included in making a
determination as what federal rate prevails and in what area is
it prevalent?

Who makes the determination that the land in the

State Lease and the land in the Federal Lease are similar in
character and what is the basis for determining similarity?
What time period is used to determine federal leases "issued...
at that time" and who makes that determination?

Even if a

prevailing federal rate is established, does it apply to the
"value of the coal removed" as stated in the federal regulation
or to the "gross sales value" as used by the State auditor in
his assessment, and who makes that determination?
-5-

For these reasons, the Court has concluded that
sub-paragraph (b) is not self-executing as to create a legal
obligation on the lessee since the identifiable factors
necessary for self-execution could not independently be
ascertained by either party.
Sub-paragraph (b) was written by the State for its
benefit and since it is not self-executing, it would require
some affirmitive action on their part to bring che provision of
that sub-paragraph into an enforceable position other than a
retroactive audit after having accepted the provisions of
sub-paragraph (a) without objection or comment.
Under these circumstances, the Court must look to
the prior conduct of the lessor and the lessees under the Lease
over a period of years that show that they chose to ingnore the
provisions of sub-paragraph (b), and to calculate the royalty
under sub-paragraph (a).
Since the State by an established course of conduct
for many years adopted a construction of the Lease that
provided for 15c a ton, they are now precluded from asserting a
different construction of the Lease where they took no
sufficient or positive action to establish their now asserted
construction to an ambiguous lease provision.
Because of the above legal conclusion, it would not
be necessary for the Court to go further, but as a further
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ground for what the Court's final conclusion and ruling will
be, the Court will address other issues presented.
The Court is of the opinion that regardless of
whether the status of the land is School Trust Land or not, the
State acts in its proprietary capacity when it enters into a
contractual lease that is authorized under law and that the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied against the State
and its Land Board as any other contracting individual.
The Court has concluded as a matter of law that the
State is estopped from demanding payment of royalty based upon
the 8% of value figure.

The undisputed facts show that the

State was aware of the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) of
Article III of their own Lease and were made aware by the
quarterly payments submitted by Plateau and its prececessors in
interest that those provisions were being ignored by leaving
that reporting column blank and by accepting, throughout the
auditing period, without question or objection, royalty based
upon 15C a ton.

If the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) were

going to be used, the State had a duty to speak which they did
not do.

By their conduct and failure to perform this duty,

they induced plaintiffs to believe that 15c a ton was the
acceptable ro.yalty and plaintiffs, in reliance thereon,
continued to mine coal under the Lease which they would not
have done had they known that the defendants were going to
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insist upon the 8% of value provision.

The great injustice

that would result to plaintiffs if we now allow the defendants
to assert this position, is quite obvious since the record
shows that to allow the imposition of the greater royalty, the
plaintiffs would show a substantial loss on all mining activity
under the State Lease.
Even if the conclusion is reached that the defendants
were acting in a governmental capacity, they would still be
estopped from asserting the new royalty rate.

No substantial

adverse effect on public policy will result if the defendants
are estopped from applying this newly determined royalty
retroactively.

The State can still proceed to lease coal lands

on any terms it feels profitable and that will give the State
the maximum return.

They still have the power to revise the

wording of their coal leases to do away with any ambiguity and
to carry out any legally established policy.
Further, the record shows that the plaintiffs would
not have entered into certain stock purchases and transfers on
the terms that were then agreed to had they known of the
State's position and the contemplated change in the royalty
provision as previously accepted, and that the plaintiffs would
suffer at this time great economic loss as a result.
The Court further finds that the State had no right
under the Lease to impose interest, except on delinquent
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payments at the legal rate, or any penalty.

A legally binding

lease cannot be altered or added to by by rules and regulations
adopted subsequently.
The Lease does state that it is subject to such
operating rules and regulations as may be hereafter approved
and adopted.

Such a provision could not be interpreted to mean

changes to or additions of monetary payment.

"Operating Rules"

has reference to method of mining and can have no other logical
interpretation.

Since the amount claimed by the State is not

subject to definitive determination, any interest that may be
due could not commence to run until demand is made.
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants
plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as prayed for
and denies defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
The attorney for the plaintiff is directed to
prepare a formal order in accordance with this opinion.
DATED this

<^>7~'^

day of February, 1988.

BOYD) BUNNELL, E^s^ricc Judqe
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